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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SA VIN GS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
WELLS R. KING, et al.,
0

0

*

Defendants,

No.
11316

GEORGE W. EV ANS and MARTHA R.
EV ANS, his wife,
Defendants and
Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents recognize that the Statement of Facts as
set forth in Appellant's Brief is accurate insofar as it goes.
However, because of omission of certain facts which Respondents feel are important, Respondents desire to supplement Appellant's State of Facts as to some details.
The Maurer Development Corporation, as seller, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Wells R.
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King and his wife on February 1, 1962 for the sale of a parcel of ground described as:
"Lot 3, Kings Village Subdivision, according to the
official plat thereof; measuring 55.25 feet wide by
115 feet dept. Also known as 620 Garden Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah."
The contract of sale recited that at that time there was "an
obligation against said property in favor of Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association .... "
On August 15, 1962, as part of a larger real estate transaction, the Kings assigned their interest as buyers in the
contract to George W. Evans and his wife (respondents
herein) and concurrently the Evans assigned their interest
in the said contract to James T. Rice and Preston Norton
and their wives. Rice and Norton were the real estate broker
and salesman who handled the whole transaction. However,
the document evidencing the latter assignment was dated
August 18, 1962.
Subsequently, on September 7, 1962 the Rices assigned
their interest in the said contract to the Nortons, who subsequently assigned their interest to one George Peterson,
on February 15, 1963.
All assignments were executed on the standard form approved by the Utah State Securities Commission and the
Utah State Realty Association. That form of assignment
contains a clause which states as follows:
"3. That in consideration of the assignors executing and deliveTing this agreement, the assignees
covenant with the assignors as follows:
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a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe
and perform all of the terms, conditions and
provisions of the said agreement that are to
be kept, observed and performed by the assignors.
b. That the assignees will save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any and all
actions, suits, costs, damages, claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason 'of an act
or omission of the assignees."
There is no other wording in the assignment which relates
to any assumption of the balance due under the contract or
an agreement to pay the same.
On November 27, 1963 Prudential Federal Savings and
Loan Association accepted a deed to the property from
Maurer Development Corporation, in lieu of a foreclosure
of its prior obligation recited in the contract. Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association also took an assignment of the rights of Maurer Development Corporation as
vendor under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Sometime subsequent to the assignment from the Rices
to the Nortons, and prior to the deed from Maurer Development Corporation to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Association, an amended description was attached to the
contract by stapling. The amended description, which was
initialed by the Maurer Development Corporation and by
Preston L. Norton and his wife, sets forth a metes and
bounds description of the property 'and also contains a statement that Kings Village Subdivision was an unrecorded
suhdivi$ion.
On or about August 16, 1966, Prudential Federal Sav-
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ings and Loan Association commenced the present action,
alleging that a default occurred on or about September 1,
1965; that it was electing to treat the contract as a note and
mortgage; and "to pass title to the buyer subject thereto"
and to foreclose the same. In its Complaint, Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association also alleged that these
Respondents and the other subsequent assignees had "assumed and agreed to pay and discharge all of the buyer's
obligations under said contract", which was denied by the
Respondents in their Answer.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR DEFICENCY
AGAINST THESE RES'PONDENTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR DEFICIENCY A'GAINST
THESE RESPONDENTS.
The view has often been expressed that for all practical
purposes the relationship of seller and purchaser under an
executory contract for the sale of land is equivalent to that
of a mortgagor-mortgagee. See Ferguson vs. Blood, 152 Fed.
98 (1907); Harris vs. Halverson, 192 Wis. 71 211 N. W. 295
(1927 ).
It is also well setted that the acceptance of an assignment of the purchaser's interest under a real estate con-
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tract does not place the assignee in privity of contract with
the seller. In Adron vs. Evans, 217 N. W. 397 (So. Dakota
1927) the Court stated as follows:
"The assignment contains no promise or agreement
on the part of Evans to pay anything. The assignment of a contract for the sale o.f real estate does not
create a personal liability on the part of the assignee without a provision to that effect. The assignee cannot require conveyance of the land to him
without payment of the contract price, but he is no;t
personally liable for that price unless he agrees or
promises to pay it."
The courts have reasoned that a stipulation in the original contract, on the part of the purchaser, to pay the price
is a personal and not a real convenant, and that it does not
pass with the purchaser's equitable interest. This is so, even
though the original contract contains a provision purporting
to bind the assigns of the original purchas·er. In Lisenby vs.
Newton, 120 Cal. 571, 52 Pac. 813 (1898), the Court said:
"There are authorities which deny that a covenant
can in any case run with an equity, or without a
legal estate in the land; we need not inquire what
limitations attend the principle, for it is clear that
the promise to pay the agreed price in a contract for
the purchase of real estate is not of itself a covenant
accompanying the equitable interest of the purchaser
into the hands of his assignee."
In Meyer vs. Droegemueller, 165 Minn. 245, 206 N. W.

391 (1925) the court stated:
"An assignment by the vendee of a contract for the
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purchase of real estate creates a privity of estate between the assignee and the original vendor, but not
a privity of cont.ract. It does not relieve the original
vendee from his contractual obligations to the nndor or impose upon the assignee any personal liability for the unpaid purchase price, unless he assumed
and agreed to pay it. That the original contract purports to bind the parties thereto, and their representatives and assigns, does not change the rule; neither
does the fact that the assignee has been, or is, in
possession of the land." (Emphasis added)
The rule is different, of course, as in the case of mortgage foreclosures where the assignee specifically assumes
the obligation and agrees to pay it. Such is the case in the
principal cases cited by the Appellant in its Brief. For example, in the case of Lonas vs. Metropolitan Mortgage and
Securities Company, 432 P. 2d 603 (Alaska, 1967 ), which is
quoted on page 6 of the Appellant's Brief, the excerpt
quoted by Appellant states as follows:
"In the assignment from the Becks to appellants,
signed by both parties, the appellants agreed with
the Becks that 'they will pay the balance due on said
real estate contract and that the balance due thereon will be the obligation of the assignees' and that
appellants 'would observe and perform all of the
terms, conditions and covenants mentioned in said
contract' .... " (Emphasis added)
in that case, there was an express assumption, in unequivocal language, which indicated that the assignees understood
and agreed that they were assuming the obligation of paying the balance due.
So also in the case of Barberich vs. Pooshichian, 211
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Pac. 236 (Cal. App. 1922), the Court, in its opinion, stated
that no evidence was offered at the trial on th:e question of
whether there had been an assumption by the assignee. However, the Court also pointed out that the plaintiff had alleged in its complaint that defendants had assumed the obligations of the contract, which allegations were not denied by the defendants. Consequently, in the Barberich case
there was no controverted issue before the court as to
whether the defendants had assumed the payment. The same
cannot be said of this case, however, since the defendants
(respondents herein) did controvert similar allegations in
plaintiff's complaint.

There is no real dispute between the parties as to the
significant of the holdings of the cases cited as they apply
to the facts of each case. The real question before this
Court is whether Paragraph 3 of the Assignment constitutes
an assumption on the part of a subsequent assignee to pay
the balance due under the original contract. As stated by
this Court in the case of Radley vs. Smith, 6 Utah 2d. 314,
313 P.2d 465 (1957):
"While it is no doubt possible for a party to become
the assignee of the rights und,er a contract without
becoming responsible for the dutfes, the que'stion
whether a purported assignment of an entire contract includes such assumption depends upon its
terms and the intent of the parties. Whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exists with respect thereto it
is proper for the court to consider all of the facts
and circumstances, including the words and actions
of the parties forming the background of the transaction."
The real question then involves a determination in each
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particular case as to whether or not an asswnption was intended by the parties by the words contained in Paragraph
3. Respondents respectfully submit that it is difficult to
ascertain the intention of the parties where a standard
form is used which does not clearly set out the obligations
of the parties. It is respectfully submitted that the average
layman would consider a real estate contract as an alternative to, and as roughly the equivalent of a mortgage in securing a real esta'te purchase. Indeed, as noted above, the
courts themselves have generally tended to minimize the
differences so as to consider them alternative means to the
same ends. The average layman would probably understand
the classical wording of a mortgage assumption (" ... which
the grantee assumes and agrees to pay") as making him liable to the seller for the balance of the purchase price. This
wording is well established through long usage and common familiarity in real estate transactions. However, Paragraph 3 supra contains no mention of any agreement on the
p'art of the assignee to "assume" or "pay" the balance due.
By its literal terms, Paragraph 3 provides as follows:
"3. That in consideration of the assignors executing
and delivering this agreement, the assignees
covenant with the assignors as follows:
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe
and perform all of the terms, conditions and
provisions of the said agreement that are to
be kept, observed and performed by the assignors.
b.

That the assignees will save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any and all
actions, suits, costs, damages, claims and de-
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mands whatsoever arising by reason of an act
or omission of the asignees."
Respondents respectfully submit that Paragraph 3, when
read together as a whole, constitutes a hold-harmless agreemnt-that is, it is an agreement between the assignor and
the as signee that the assignee will do the things required
of the assignor under the contract and if he fails to do so
will hold :the assignor harmless from his default. As such
the hold-harmless agreement is a personal agreement in the
nature of an indemnity between the assignor and the assignee and cannot be assigned by either. There is nothing
about the wording of Paragraph 3 which would manifest
any intention on the part of either the assignor or the assignee to benefit any third person who is not a party to the
contract. This is an essential element, which Appellant must
establish, since it seeks directly as a third party to· enforc·e
the terms of an agreement to which it was not a party.
In the case of Montgomery vs. Rief, 15 Ut. 495, SO Pac.
1

623 (1897) the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"To entitle a third party, who may be benefitted by
the performance of a contract, to sue, there must
have been an intention on the part of the contracting
parties to secure some direct benefit to him, or there
must be some privity and some obligation or duty
from the promisor to the third party which will enable him to enforce the contract, o·r some equitable
claim to the benefit resulting from the promise or
the performance of the contract, and there must be
some legal right on the part of the third party to
adopt and claim the benefit of the promis·e or contract. 'To entitle him to an action,' said Mr. Justice
Rapallo in Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 'the contract must have been made for his benefit. He must
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be the party intended to be benefited.' 'But it is
not every contract for the benefit of a third person
that is enforceable by the beneficiary. It must appear that the contract was made and was intended
for his benefit. The fact that he is incidentally
named in the contract, or that the contract, if carried
out according to its terms, would inure to his benefit, is not sufficient to entitle him to demand its
fulfillment. It must appear to have been the intention of the parties to secure to him personally the
benefit of its provisions'."
Judged by the foregoing law, it would appear that there is
nothing in the assignment which would indicate any intention on the part of the Kings or the Evans to benefit
the original vendor under the contract, and particularly
there would be no intention to benefit Prudential Federal
Savings and Loan Association, which at the time of the assignmen't was a mortgagee of the original vendor.
In considering "all of the facts and circumstances, including the words and acts of the parties forming the background of the transaction" (a!s per the Radley case, su,pra)
it would appe'ar that Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Association is really only trying to upgrade the mortgage
which it originally held. It would be rather far-fetched for
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association to assert
that either the original purchaser or any of their subsequent
assignees had assumed the sellers mortgage and agreed to
pay the balance due thereon. In reality, Prudential Federal
Savings and Loan Association is attempting to do indirectly
what it could not do directly.
In considering all of the facts and circumstances, it is
clearly established by the acts of the parties that the Evans
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never intended to take possession of the real es:tate which
was the subject matter of the contract, for they assigned
their interest in the contract to the real estate agents who
negotiated the transaction for them immediately upon receiving the assignment.

In its Brief, Appellant has asserted that the Court erroneously disregarded an assignment of claims made by the
Kings to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association.
However, this assignment purports to assign the benefits
of the hold-harmless agreement between the Kings and the
Evans, which is not assignable, as a matter of law. Furthermore, the assignment was made approximately 7 months
after the commencement of the foreclosure action and after
the Kings (who never filed an Answer in this matter) were
in default.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the trial court did not err in dismissing the claim of
Pruden'tial Federal Savings and Loan Association for a deficiency judgment against Respondents, and it is respectfully urged that this Court affirm the decision of the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN G. MARSHALL
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
Suite 721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

